Sequential Membership Inference Attacks
AI 摘要
提出了一种利用模型更新序列进行更强的成员推理攻击的方法SeMI*。
主要贡献
- 提出了最优的序列成员推理攻击SeMI*
- 推导了SeMI*的理论最优功率
- 实验验证了SeMI*在隐私审计方面的有效性
方法论
通过分析模型更新序列,设计最优的成员推理攻击,并进行理论推导和实验验证。
原文摘要
Modern AI models are not static. They go through multiple updates in their lifecycles. Thus, exploiting the model dynamics to create stronger Membership Inference (MI) attacks and tighter privacy audits are timely questions. Though the literature empirically shows that using a sequence of model updates can increase the power of MI attacks, rigorous analysis of the `optimal' MI attacks is limited to static models with infinite samples. Hence, we develop an `optimal' MI attack, SeMI*, that uses the sequence of model updates to identify the presence of a target inserted at a certain update step. For the empirical mean computation, we derive the optimal power of SeMI*, while accessing a finite number of samples with or without privacy. Our results retrieve the existing asymptotic analysis. We observe that having access to the model sequence avoids the dilution of MI signals unlike the existing attacks on the final model, where the MI signal vanishes as training data accumulates. Furthermore, an adversary can use SeMI* to tune both the insertion time and the canary to yield tighter privacy audits. Finally, we conduct experiments across data distributions and models trained or fine-tuned with DP-SGD demonstrating that practical variants of SeMI* lead to tighter privacy audits than the baselines.