SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agents
AI 摘要
该论文系统性地研究了LLM Agent中Agentic Skills的生命周期、设计模式、表示方法及其安全问题。
主要贡献
- 提出了技能的七种设计模式
- 提出了技能的表示和范围的分类
- 分析了技能的安全和治理风险
方法论
通过对现有Agentic Skills的分析,构建了分类体系,并进行了安全案例研究和基准评估。
原文摘要
Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, \textit{a.k.a., agentic skills}, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit applicability conditions, execution policies, termination criteria, and reusable interfaces. Unlike one-off plans or atomic tool calls, skills operate (and often do well) across tasks. This paper maps the skill layer across the full lifecycle (discovery, practice, distillation, storage, composition, evaluation, and update) and introduces two complementary taxonomies. The first is a system-level set of \textbf{seven design patterns} capturing how skills are packaged and executed in practice, from metadata-driven progressive disclosure and executable code skills to self-evolving libraries and marketplace distribution. The second is an orthogonal \textbf{representation $\times$ scope} taxonomy describing what skills \emph{are} (natural language, code, policy, hybrid) and what environments they operate over (web, OS, software engineering, robotics). We analyze the security and governance implications of skill-based agents, covering supply-chain risks, prompt injection via skill payloads, and trust-tiered execution, grounded by a case study of the ClawHavoc campaign in which nearly 1{,}200 malicious skills infiltrated a major agent marketplace, exfiltrating API keys, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser credentials at scale. We further survey deterministic evaluation approaches, anchored by recent benchmark evidence that curated skills can substantially improve agent success rates while self-generated skills may degrade them. We conclude with open challenges toward robust, verifiable, and certifiable skills for real-world autonomous agents.