The logic of KM belief update is contained in the logic of AGM belief revision
AI 摘要
该论文证明AGM信念修正逻辑包含KM信念更新逻辑,并缩小了两者在处理非惊讶信息上的差异。
主要贡献
- 建立了KM信念更新公理和模态逻辑之间的对应关系
- 证明了AGM信念修正逻辑包含KM信念更新逻辑
- 指出了两种逻辑在处理非惊讶信息上的差异
方法论
将KM和AGM信念修正的公理转换为模态逻辑公理,然后比较所得逻辑系统的定理。
原文摘要
For each axiom of KM belief update we provide a corresponding axiom in a modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator $B$, a bimodal conditional operator $>$ and the unimodal necessity operator $\square$. We then compare the resulting logic to the similar logic obtained from converting the AGM axioms of belief revision into modal axioms and show that the latter contains the former. Denoting the latter by $\mathcal L_{AGM}$ and the former by $\mathcal L_{KM}$ we show that every axiom of $\mathcal L_{KM}$ is a theorem of $\mathcal L_{AGM}$. Thus AGM belief revision can be seen as a special case of KM belief update. For the strong version of KM belief update we show that the difference between $\mathcal L_{KM}$ and $\mathcal L_{AGM}$ can be narrowed down to a single axiom, which deals exclusively with unsurprising information, that is, with formulas that were not initially disbelieved.