AgentSCOPE: Evaluating Contextual Privacy Across Agentic Workflows
AI 摘要
AgentSCOPE评估Agentic工作流中的上下文隐私,发现中间环节存在大量隐私泄露。
主要贡献
- 提出Privacy Flow Graph框架,分解agentic执行过程并追踪隐私泄露源
- 构建AgentSCOPE基准测试,包含62个跨多个领域的场景
- 评估多个LLM,揭示pipeline中隐私泄露普遍存在,且传统方法低估了风险
方法论
使用Contextual Integrity理论构建Privacy Flow Graph,分析Agentic pipeline的每个信息流,并在基准测试上评估LLM的隐私泄露情况。
原文摘要
Agentic systems are increasingly acting on users' behalf, accessing calendars, email, and personal files to complete everyday tasks. Privacy evaluation for these systems has focused on the input and output boundaries, but each task involves several intermediate information flows, from agent queries to tool responses, that are not currently evaluated. We argue that every boundary in an agentic pipeline is a site of potential privacy violation and must be assessed independently. To support this, we introduce the Privacy Flow Graph, a Contextual Integrity-grounded framework that decomposes agentic execution into a sequence of information flows, each annotated with the five CI parameters, and traces violations to their point of origin. We present AgentSCOPE, a benchmark of 62 multi-tool scenarios across eight regulatory domains with ground truth at every pipeline stage. Our evaluation across seven state-of-the-art LLMs show that privacy violations in the pipeline occur in over 80% of scenarios, even when final outputs appear clean (24%), with most violations arising at the tool-response stage where APIs return sensitive data indiscriminately. These results indicate that output-level evaluation alone substantially underestimates the privacy risk of agentic systems.