Uncovering Memorization in Timeseries Imputation models: LBRM Membership Inference and its link to attribute Leakage
AI 摘要
该论文揭示了时间序列模型在黑盒设置下存在的记忆化和属性泄露风险,并提出了新的推理攻击方法。
主要贡献
- 提出了一种基于参考模型的新型成员推理攻击方法,提高了检测精度。
- 首次针对时间序列模型设计了属性推理攻击,可以预测训练数据的敏感特征。
- 在从头训练和微调模型上评估了攻击的有效性,证明了模型的脆弱性。
方法论
设计了两阶段攻击框架,包括基于参考模型的成员推理攻击和属性推理攻击,并在attention和autoencoder架构上进行实验。
原文摘要
Deep learning models for time series imputation are now essential in fields such as healthcare, the Internet of Things (IoT), and finance. However, their deployment raises critical privacy concerns. Beyond the well-known issue of unintended memorization, which has been extensively studied in generative models, we demonstrate that time series models are vulnerable to inference attacks in a black-box setting. In this work, we introduce a two-stage attack framework comprising: (1) a novel membership inference attack based on a reference model that improves detection accuracy, even for models robust to overfitting-based attacks, and (2) the first attribute inference attack that predicts sensitive characteristics of the training data for timeseries imputation model. We evaluate these attacks on attention-based and autoencoder architectures in two scenarios: models that are trained from scratch, and fine-tuned models where the adversary has access to the initial weights. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed membership attack retrieves a significant portion of the training data with a tpr@top25% score significantly higher than a naive attack baseline. We show that our membership attack also provides a good insight of whether attribute inference will work (with a precision of 90% instead of 78% in the genral case).